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Abstract
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Economic integration in the world is not always an explicit and intentional process. For some regions we 
are able to observe unintentional coordination of economic policies that results from following similar 
institutional and legal solutions. One of such cases can be recognized in the nominal sector of the natio-
nal economy. As a consequence, a group of countries may be forming a de-facto currency union. It could 
alternatively compose an OCA without any need for forced nominal convergence. This paper focuses on 
monetary policy stance and its developments in the period from 1981 to 2013 of a very special group 
of resource-based economies. The GCC countries share many similarities in the underlying exchange 
rate regime solutions. They are in the same time following some explicit economic integration initiati-
ves. It happens, however, that due to the financial turmoil after 2008, many of the integration processes 
have been reversed, or stopped. An empirical research tries to answer a question of the extent to which 
the integration process in nominal sector has been developing. For this purpose the monetary policy 
stance correlation is measured. Observing its developments, with a cointegration analysis in a standard 
(non-structural) VAR model, delivers interesting insights into an issue of the GCC as an OCA. With statis-
tical data provided by the World Bank (WDI Database) it is possible to observe significant convergence in 
monetary policy stance among all but one of the GCC countries. This study draws attention to a broader 
picture of a region that has potential of benefiting from a common market. However, not all GCC coun-
tries seem to be suited for economic integration in nominal sector. It is Bahrain that shows significant 
divergence for the whole period covered. There may be many country-specific factors, but persistence of 
asymmetry in monetary policy in this particular case allows for skeptical thoughts. If the GCC initiatives 
are continued, the economic integration will be more challenging in the new situation. As the observed 
convergence in monetary policy stance has been present from late 1970s one could suggest that it could 
have been a non-intentional process, but a result of similar exchange rate regimes. However, the latter 
divergence has been a result of conscious changes in the economic policies that affect the nominal sector.
KEYWORDS: monetary policy, monetary integration, GCC, economic integration, MPSI.
In today’s globalized and increasingly integrated world, another issue emerges – the consequ-
ences of economic stability and the efficiency of monetary policy flowing from developments 
in relative restrictiveness domestically and globally. Capital flows are no longer restricted due 
to liberalized balance-of-payments accounts. International capital movements are driven by di-
fferences in the rates of return between domestic and foreign assets, with the former being, 
to some degree, influenced by domestic monetary policy. This may have a blurring effect on 
any study trying to identify the international coordination of monetary policy in a small open 
economy. Therefore, a new instrument is required to capture restrictiveness developments for 
international comparative studies and economic integration studies. This is one of reasons for 
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studying monetary developments in more than one country. This approach is intended for both 
policy analysis and formulation and for testing the channels of monetary policy transmission in 
the globalized world. The following study on the similarity in monetary policy stance shall fill the 
gap in the literature on the GCC countries as the OCA.
The efficiency of monetary policy in achieving its goals requires knowledge of variables influenc-
ing private agents’ reaction to changes in monetary policy stance they perceive. These variables 
are very often perceived as characteristics of the financial sector (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992, 
Kashyap and Stein, 2000) or features of the non-financial sector entities (Bernanke and Ger-
tler, 1995, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994). There is a wide variety of monetary policy assessment 
methodologies. Some are based on market interest rates prevailing in the economy (Ng, Smith, 
and Smith, 1999) or in a specific market (Goodfriend, 1993) or focus on specific market rates 
(Nilsen, 2002). Other make use of information included in monetary aggregates and in their rates 
of change (Abell, 1991). Another appraised method uses non-borrowed reserves (Bernanke and 
Mihov, 1998). Bernanke and Mihov (1998) point out the need to consider money supply jointly 
with money demand. This is what the MPSI methodology offers. An index, like the MCI approach 
(Freedman, 1994), is also very popular. A separate group of measures is based on the “narrative 
approach” (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, Romer and Romer, 1989, Boschen and Mills, 1991). In 
this case the timing of monetary impulses (but not their strength) is recognized and search for 
responses of real variables follows. There is an eclectic approach too. It uses a combination of 
several of the aforementioned methods to recognize and measure monetary shocks (Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, Evans, 1996, Kashyap and Stein, 2000).
However, some of variables that are used to measure monetary policy stance are not free from 
the problem of endogenous behavior (Ellingsen and Söderström, 2001). Some are just lacking in 
credible theoretical foundations (Bernanke and Mihov, 1998). They often assume an incorrect na-
ture of the underlying time series features, as pointed out by Eika, Ericsson and Nymoen (1996). 
This study of monetary policy stance in the GCC countries is intended to offer an alternative 
approach to methods used in studies reviewed by Ugai (2007). Using the Monetary policy Stance 
indicator (MPSI) concept and controlling for some international developments, it is possible to 
provide some evidence on similarity in the monetary policy stance in some of the GCC countries 
over the period 1981-2013.
Monetary 
policy 
assessment 
methods in 
brief
MPSI 
Methodology
The core idea at the roots of the proposed method is an alternative interpretation for short-term 
shocks of money velocity. Money velocity (V) can be derived directly from the Fisher’s equation 
(exchange equation MV=TP). This variable is defined as the relationship between the nominal 
value of transactions (T*P) and the nominal money stock (M) servicing those transactions. The 
nominal GDP may be a good proxy for nominal money demand since it is the total expenditure on 
final goods and services (one of the approaches used in compiling this aggregate). Calculating the 
ratio of money demand to money supply offers a basis for compiling a proxy for developments in 
monetary conditions (MPSI).
Money velocity describes the manner, in which agents in the economy use money. The mone-
tarist model assumes that money velocity is constant. However, is it really? When we focus on 
factors that could be responsible for changing the behavior of a society on this matter, the theory 
offers us “financial innovations“ as a reason for decreasing average real money balances (i.e. 
demand for cash) and increasing velocity. For velocity based on M2, one observes, however, a 
systematic negative trend (Figure 1).
This is obviously inconsistent with the monetary economics theory. The example of GCC countries 
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is not unique. Velocity is systema-
tically decreasing. It is argued that 
in spite of significant “financial in-
novation” (that should drive velocity 
up) some other factors offset this 
effect. The first point is that broader 
monetary aggregates are beyond 
control of the central bank, as pro-
ved already by Revenkar and Yoshi-
no (1990). There seem to be some 
other forces behind these clear and 
sharp, short-term but significantly 
homoscedastic developments in 
VM0.
They are far from being good 
proxies for either transaction mo-
ney stock or targets of monetary 
policy. Instead, the proposed MPSI 
method focuses on velocity of cur-
rency in circulation (high-power 
money) proxy. Any change in the 
manner society uses currency sho-
uld be gradual. For sure, it should 
not look like the fluctuations obser-
ved in the empirical data (Figure 2).
Figure 1
Money velocity 
(M2-based) for GCC 
countries 1976-2013 
(Author)
Figure 2
Random country example 
of money velocity shocks 
for different money 
aggregates 1996-2008 
(Author)
The suggestion is that monetary policy is responsible for this behavior. Short-term shocks of 
money velocity are fully a part of a transmission mechanism, as suggested already by Rey-
nard (2007). This view is explicitly consistent with several methods for capturing monetary policy 
stance. The most obvious examples of methods consistent with the proposed one are: (1) the 
“credit channel” (Kashyap and Stein, 2000) and (2) the “balance sheet channel” (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995) and with commonly used econometric models (3) assuming an indirect impact of 
monetary policy on inflation (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994).
The Monetary Policy Stance Indicator (MPSI) is defined as the first difference time series of mo-
ney velocity, expressed as a percentage change over the preceding period. Due to such formu-
lation it is able to capture both the qualitative and quantitative information on monetary situation. 
With assumption of the constant velocity, money growth rate that offsets actual rate of growth 
for output at the same ratio means that there is no reason for prices to adjust. A similar interpre-
tation can be found in Reynard (2007, p. 26). It was, however, already Henry Thornton (1802) who 
proposed the same interpretation.
The MPSI seems to be independent from many, if not from most, of the postulated disadvanta-
ges and technical weaknesses of all other methods. It is also independent from specific features 
of monetary policy reaction function. It requires no modeling of any kind or estimating any of 
unobservable variables (i.e. output gap). The aforementioned weaknesses are the reason for 
criticisms of all past monetary policy stance assessment frameworks.
The MPSI method assumes nominal rigidity during the current period (at least one quarter). 
Otherwise, any change in the real money supply in relation to demand for real cash balances is 
removed by the price adjustment resulting in super neutrality of money.
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Compilation of the MPSI must be based on the high-power money, or money available for tran-
sactions in the shortest horizon. Therefore, aggregates like M0 must be used. These aggregates’ 
behavior depends in the least extent on the specific features regarding society and the financial 
sector. Another point is that a central bank has direct and credible control over them.
The MPSI is based on a proxy of the nominal transactional money demand – the GDP. This 
design mitigates any problems that might be associated with controlling for the income demand 
element in the total money demand.
Using the nominal GDP also deals with the problem of controlling for new assets prices, when 
one evaluates monetary policy. Prices of non-perishable, long-lasting assets newly produced are 
included in both “C” and “I”. Including monetary base (M0) in the compilation of MPSI allows for 
controlling for financial and real assets’ prices.
MPSI represents a quantitative and qualitative measure of monetary conditions in the economy 
induced by intentional and unintentional monetary policy. This is why it is suggested that money 
supply/demand movements (implicitly) represent monetary policy exogenous shocks as well 
as endogenous reactions to some other variables and shocks. This is invariant with operating 
procedures and regimes, as monetary imbalance is the cause of inflation and money is neutral 
in the long run.
It is possible to implement the abovementioned method for capturing monetary policy stance 
in international comparative studies and in research focused on international interdependency 
and economic integration studies (Mlodkowski, 2008). The empirical exercise that follows offers 
an in-depth insight into economic integration over time in monetary policy stance. As such, it is 
a valuable reference for any discussion on the causes and consequences of regional economic 
cooperation, like the GCC initiative, that aims to mimic the one in Europe.
The Persian Gulf and its coast is a strategic region for the global economy. It contains the biggest 
reserves of crude oil in the world. According to OPEC statistics, this region1 is in possession of 
almost 64% of proven total crude oil reserves. The Gulf Cooperation Council gathers five out of 
seven countries that are located in the Arab Gulf, namely Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, 
and United Arab Emirates. Oman is the last member, although not regarded as located in the 
Arab Gulf. However, it is of strategic importance due to its neighborhood with the Strait of Hor-
muz. This is the only water passage leading from the Persian Gulf to the open sea. According to 
Energy Information Administration, about 90% of oil transited from the Arab Gulf went through 
the Strait of Hormuz. Taking into consideration all of these factors, the importance of the GCC 
countries for the international economic relations cannot be underestimated.
Given the historical instability in the GCC region, the economic and monetary integration could 
be desirable for the purpose of maintaining sustainable growth and peace. This would firm the 
connections between the members and create collective security in face of external threats. It 
could also soothe some border conflicts that are still present. Indeed, the GCC planned to intro-
duce a common currency already in 2010. However, due to global financial crisis and its waves, 
the idea has been abandoned by governments of some of the GCC countries. Apart from political 
rationale, there is a set of crucial economic benefits that a group of highly integrated countries 
could capture, if a common market and a common currency are effectively achieved. First of all, 
a single currency in the GCC region will lead to the removal of the transaction costs (Mlodkowski, 
2013). As proved, in a formal theoretical model by Mlodkowski & Bywaters (2012), such situation 
fuels economic growth. In addition, companies operating in more than one country will be able 
1  Including Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman.
Short history 
of the GCC 
economic 
integration
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to reduce costs, and delivery time of cross-border money transfers. Another benefit is the elim-
ination of the uncertainty about the foreign exchange rates that may inhibit the foreign trade to 
some extent (Mlodkowski, 2007). The favorable consequences of the common currency in this 
aspect include the increase of the general economic efficiency, and further economic integration 
via intensified intraregional trade in the non-oil sectors. This is particularly important for the GCC 
fiscal stability. Finally, the GCC members with a common currency and common customs policy 
could strengthen their bargaining power in negotiating trade agreements.
Next to the benefits of a common currency, there are some potential drawbacks as well. This 
basically originates from the fact that, all of the members will have to give away a portion of their 
autonomy both in monetary, as well as in fiscal policy (Mlodkowski, 2008). The implication is that 
no country will be able to change the value of its currency against another currency in case of 
some macroeconomic problems. However, there is a very good argument against this theoretical 
drawback. For most of the GCC countries the fixed exchange rate regime operated successfully 
for many years. There was no need to use depreciation in order to deal with external imbalance. 
Instead, this is the fiscal policy that has to handle any internal imbalances (Mlodkowski, 2009).
Another potential drawback is due to spill-over effects. The abovementioned potential issues 
may never become problematic, as active monetary policy has been rarely seen in the region. 
For many years all of the GCC countries operated in a setup that is called pseudo-monetary union 
with the USA (and with each other) due to the fixed exchange rate regime that prevailed until the 
first decade of the 21st century.
Summarizing, all six members of the GCC countries are similar in terms of history, geography, 
politics (monarchies with limited participation), population (small size, except Saudi Arabia), with 
the majority of Sunni (except Bahrain), culture, language, and religion. In economic terms, hy-
drocarbon resources are dominant. Oil accounts for one third of the GDP, for three quarters of 
government revenue and for three quarters of exports (Hanna, 2006). Owing to high prices of oil 
at the turn of millennia, their economies significantly expanded. However, oil price developments 
in 2014/2015 exercise negative impact on all of the GCC countries.
There has been big scale economic integration initiative in the region. The Gulf Cooperation Council 
introduced a custom union in 2003. It should have granted the free movement of goods, services, 
people and capital. This was supposed to help to deal with possible asymmetric shocks. However, 
the actual situation in 2015 is far from what is understood as the common market or a customs 
union. There are still very long and time consuming customs procedures at the internal GCC bor-
ders. They result in increasing transactions costs for all stakeholders.  It is worth noting that cultural 
and language similarities make the movement of people and capital far easier than in the EU.
It was already more than a decade ago, in 2004, when the GCC countries agreed on the conver-
gence criteria for the purpose of a currency union. These were partly adopted from the European 
Monetary Union set of criteria. They included in the GCC such elements as:
 _ budget deficit less than 3% of GDP,
 _ public sector debt less than 60% of GDP,
 _ currency reserves in excess of 4 months of imports,
 _ interest rates not higher than the average of the three lowest countries by more than 2%,
 _ and inflation not higher than the weighted average of the six countries by more than 2%.
In case of the first criterion, one should remember that all GCC countries budgets depend strong-
ly on crude oil price. With severe deterioration of the oil price in late 2014 and in early 2015 many 
of the GCC countries face the threat of substantial and permanent deficits. As noted already by 
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Mlodkowski (2010), it may lead to detrimental effects for the economic growth via the crowd-
ing-out of private investment. 
The GCC members are relatively open economies. Central governments have been promoting FDI 
for many years (Jadresic, 2002). Moreover, they have been harmonizing rules and regulations with 
regard to economic activity. All GCC members’ currencies used to be pegged to the US dollar. The 
USD used to act as an anchor for external value of all GCC currencies. This situation started to 
change due to the most recent financial crisis. Some of the GCC countries decided to follow a differ-
ent approach, and pegged the external value of their national currencies to a basket of currencies. 
Such decisions were a step back in the process of economic and monetary integration.
Data used for the empirical study on the de-facto monetary integration comes from the World 
Bank on-line WDI Database. For some of the GCC countries consistent time series for the nom-
inal GDP and narrow monetary aggregates start in 1960s. However, this is only the period from 
1981 to 2013, when all of the observations for all of the countries are available. Therefore, in 
spite of possibility to conduct individual studies for the period as early as 1960-1970, the results 
presented reflect the period 1981-2013.
Money velocity based on the annual observations for the nominal GDP and M0 aggregate was 
compiled in the first step of the empirical analysis. Then, the MPSI was derived, as the first differ-
ence series for VM0. Figure 3 presents VM0 for all GCC countries: Bahrain, KSA, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, and UAE.
The main idea to capture a process of monetary situation convergence among the GCC coun-
tries called for correlation study. It could be expected that with similar exchange rate arrange-
Cointegration 
of monetary 
policy in 
the GCC 
countries
Figure 3
Money velocity (VM0) in 
the GCC countries 1981-
2013 (Author)
Table 1 
Correlation coefficients of 
monetary policy stance 
indicator for the GCC 
countries for the period 
1981-2013
Source: Author.
UAE KSA BAH OMA KUW QAT
UAE 1      
KSA 0.67 1     
BAH 0.33 0.29 1    
OMA 0.71 0.72 0.38 1   
KUW 0.22 0.38 0.29 0.39 1  
QAT 0.38 0.48 0.56 0.54 0.27 1
ments and similarities in the 
underlying real sector activi-
ties, there should be a signif-
icant similarity in monetary 
conditions developments over 
time. Using a moving correla-
tion coefficient with a five year 
long window allows observ-
ing relative changes in nom-
inal sector among pairs of 
countries. There are 15 pairs 
made of six of the GCC coun-
tries. Correlation coefficients 
for the period 1981-2013 are 
presented in Table 1.
Bahrain seems to be the 
only outlier in the GCC group 
concerning monetary policy 
stance. The rest of the coun-
tries used to perform contin-
uously in a manner that justi-
fies a conclusion on significant 
and far-reaching similarity in 
monetary policy. It can be ob-
served in Figure 4.
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For the whole period covered 
(1981-2013) the correlation 
coefficient remained positive 
and significantly different from 
zero. It oscillated in the upper 
region for its range, close 
to plus unity. Such situation 
calls for a conclusion that this 
de-facto coordination of mon-
etary policy creates favorable 
conditions for creation of a 
monetary union. Substituting 
national monetary policies 
with a common one would not 
generate asymmetric shocks, 
Figure 4
MPSI moving correlation 
Coefficient for all GCC 
countries (Author).
as monetary situation has been identical in countries considered. In fact, the observed perfor-
mance at each country level has been as if there has been one common central bank for the GCC 
countries already. Referring to the OCA literature and to the de-facto monetary unions section 
one can conclude that the central bank that has been responsible for formulation of monetary 
policy for all of them has been the Federal Reserve of the USA. Therefore, any arguments against 
the common central bank for the GCC countries, based on “giving up monetary policy indepen-
dence” have been lacking any ground, as there has been no such independence so far.
The empirical study on similarity of monetary policy stance in the GCC countries over the period 
of the last three decades delivers an interesting picture. Due to factors discussed earlier in this 
paper, there has been a significant high positive correlation of the monetary policy stance in the 
region. When compared with the situation in Europe, prior to the creation of the EMU in 1999, it 
is obvious that the GCC countries have been suited for a currency union in much greater extent 
that the EU countries (Mlodkowski 2011). This has been achieved by means other than the nom-
inal convergence criteria, formulated for the EMU members in the Maastricht Treaty. The GCC 
countries compose an OCA, but still formal monetary integration is not present. There is an al-
ternative situation that we may label “de-facto monetary integration”. In the same time, the EMU 
Conclusions
Figure 5
Correlation coefficients 
for MPSI in the most 
recent period 2010-2014 
(Author)
countries enjoy the common 
currency benefits in spite they 
do not meet the OCA criteria, 
and they do not perform in a 
manner justifying the com-
mon monetary policy.
As the presented case shows, 
the formal monetary integra-
tion may be postponed due to 
some other considerations. 
The EMU example indicates 
that political will is able to 
overcome reservations re-
sulting from not meeting the 
OCA criteria that used to be 
pronounced as justifying cre-
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ation of a common currency. Political factors are able to mitigate also the fact of explicit violation 
of the limits and requirements imposed on EMU member states. By comparison, it is highly 
possible that the reason for not observing a new common currency in the GCC countries is also 
‘political’. Otherwise, we should have a new GCC common currency in the global economy that 
would definitely become an important reserve currency, and a unit of account and payments for 
international trade in hydrocarbons.
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